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Data suggest the distribution of wealth among households in the United States and 
the United Kingdom has become more equal over the last century — though the pattern 
may have reversed recently.   This paper shows that a model in which all households save 
for life–cycle reasons and some for dynastic purposes as well offers a possible 
explanation: the model predicts rising cross–sectional equality of wealth when longevity 
increases.  In terms of recent changes, the model suggests that expansion of social 
security programs and government debt can lead toward more wealth inequality, and that 
slower growth may do the same. 
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Life–cycle and bequest–related saving seem to occur together in practice, and this pa-
per attempts to demonstrate that an economic modelincorporating both has advantages
over conventional analytical approaches which specialize to only one.1 In particular, with a
compound modelone can study the consequences of exogenous shifts in the rel ative impor-
tance of the two motives for saving, and that constitutes the present paper’s focus. This
paper shows how such shifts can aﬀect cross–sectional wealth inequality, and it suggests
possibl e interpretations for severalempiricalpuzzl es.
Darby (1979, c.3) presents one puzzle. He notes that life and retirement spans in the
U.S. have lengthened considerably in the last century, that one would think this should
have substantially increased life–cycle saving, but that data shows a roughly constant
aggregative saving rate. Darby concludes that life–cycle saving may not be quantitatively
important. In contrast, Section 3 below shows that the present paper’s hybrid model can
simultaneously allow a substantial role for life–cycle saving and an increase in that role
without a corresponding change in aggregative wealth accumulation.
Second, data show the U.S. distribution of wealth is more unequal than the distri-
bution of earnings (Diaz–Gimenez et al., 1997). Although the life–cycle model is broadly
consistent with such a relation, it does not seem able to predict the very large wealth
shares of, say, the richest 1 and 5% of U.S. households (Huggett, 1996). Section 6 below
shows that the present paper’s model, on the other hand, can explain a very concentrated
upper tailfor the weal th distribution.
Third, various sources suggest that a number of countries have experienced changes
in their wealth distributions during the twentieth century. Wolﬀ (1996), for example, ﬁnds
a reduction in wealth inequality in the last 75 years for the U.S., U.K., and Sweden —
perhaps followed by an upturn after 1980 in the United States. Atkinson et al. (1989) ﬁnd
even sharper reductions for British data 1923–81. Surprisingly, our model shows how this
secular pattern may be related to Darby’s observations on demographic change.
In this paper’s model, some family lines, speciﬁcally, a fraction λ, are altruistic in
the sense of caring about the utility of their adult children and subsequent descendants.
Such households may choose to accumulate estates for bequests. Nonaltruistic families
care solely about their own lives. A mixture of bequest–motivated and life–cycle saving
can therefore emerge. The model shows that bequest–motivated wealth accumulation will
tend to be highly interest elastic and, when there is a mixture of saving behaviors, will tend
to cause wealth inequality as altruists save more than nonaltruists. Analysis then implies
that demographic changes which increase incentives for life–cycle saving need not aﬀect the
economy’s interest rate, which interest sensitive dynastic behavior sets. However, as life–
cycle accumulations rise despite the economy’s overall capital stock remaining the same,
the composition of overall saving must adjust, with estate building declining in relative
signiﬁcance. The latter shift can, in time, diminish wealth inequality.
1 The importance of life–cycle saving seems evident (Modigliani, 1988). For discussions
of the possible quantitative signiﬁcance of intergenerational transfers, see Kotlikoﬀ and
Summers (1981), Kotlikoﬀ (1988), and Gale and Scholz (1994).
2The idea that only some family lines manifest altruism is necessary for this paper’s
principal outcomes. Empirically, many households do not seem connected to their descen-
dants through positive intergenerationaltransfers (Al tonji et al., 1992, 1997; Laitner and
Ohlsson, 2001; Laitner and Juster, 1996). A simple explanation would be that preference
orderings diﬀer among families. That is this paper’s viewpoint: this paper assumes that λ
is exogenously given and is neither 0 nor 1.2 Alternatively, all families may be altruistic
but earning ability diﬀerences may induce only some to want to leave positive bequests.
In other words, high earners may desire to share with their descendants through inter-
generationaltransfers, whereas l ow earners may expect their descendants to have higher
consumption than they do without their assistance. Laitner (1992), Fuster (1998), and
Nishiyama (2000) examine such frameworks. The present paper’s modelhas the virtues of
being simpler and more convenient to analyze, and it may help to develop predictions and
intuitive explanations of comparative static results for the complicated, stochastic systems.
In this paper’s model all households save for life–cycle reasons but, as stated, some
have dynastic time horizons as well. Sections 1–5 present a theoretical analysis of the basic
framework and examine the possible eﬀects of changes in mortality, social security, and the
rate of technological progress. They demonstrate that the model is tractable for studying
both long and short–run issues. Section 6 presents a calibrated numerical example, and it
simulates the possible quantitative impacts of recent policy and demographic changes.
1. A Simple Model
For expositional simplicity, Sections 1–5 assume two–period lives. Throughout, this
paper assumes that within each birth cohort a set fraction 1−λ of households save for life–
cycle purposes alone, and that the remaining fraction λ desire both life–cycle saving and
an estate. Children of bequeathors become bequeathors themselves. Section 6 elaborates
the model to include realistic life spans.
Household Behavior. Suppose each household lives two periods, inelastically supplying
one unit of labor in its ﬁrst period of life, and spending its second period in retirement.
A household raises children during its ﬁrst period. The next period the children form
their own households and pass their ﬁrst period of adult life — while their parents are
retired. For simplicity, think of one–adult households, each raising one child.3 There is
exogenous labor–augmenting technological progress at rate g − 1: a household born at t
supplies gt “eﬀective labor units” in its youth. The wage per eﬀective labor unit is Wt.
Until Section 6, assume all households of the same birth cohort have the same earning
ability.
Conditionalon receiving inheritance it and leaving bequest it+1, a household born
at t has lifetime utility
u(it,i t+1,t,W t,R t+1)= m a x
c1t,c2t≥0
{(1 − θ) · v(c1t)+θ · v(c2t)}, (1)
2 Woodford (1986) and Michel and Pestieau (1998), for example, also use heterogeneous
preferences.
3 Laitner (1991) shows that this type of formulation is equivalent to having 2–adult
households, 2 children per household, and (strictly) assortative mating.
3subject to: c1t +
c2t
Rt+1




where c1t is the household’s ﬁrst period of adult life consumption, c2t is its second–period
consumption, the price of the single consumption good is always 1, Rt+1 is one plus the
interest rate on savings carried from period t to t +1 ,a n dθ ∈ (0,1) registers the weight
households put on consumption in old age relative to youth. All households have the same
θ. If households are impatient, θ will be small; similarly, if, for example, minor children
receive a large allocation of households’ total resources, 1 − θ will tend to be high. To





,γ < 1o rv(c)=ln ( c). (3)
For algebraic simplicity, the ﬁrst ﬁve sections of this paper restrict themselves to the
logarithmic case, corresponding to γ = 0. Most results carry over simply for γ  =0 ,a s
the comments below indicate. Performing the maximization in (1)–(2) for the logarithmic
case,
c1t =( 1− θ) · [Wt · gt + it −
it+1
Rt+1
]a n dc2t =
θ
1 − θ
· Rt+1 · c1t. (4)
For the fraction of households who are not altruistic, set it = it+1 = 0. Expression (4)
characterizes their behavior. Letting s1t be the saving of young, nonaltruistic households,
s1t = θ · Wt · gt. (5)
Households which are altruistic have the same lifetime utility function and, conditional
on their inheritances and bequests, solve the same lifetime problem. This paper assumes






ξt · u(it,i t+1,t,W t,R t+1), (6)
where (1)–(2) determine u(.). The intergenerationalsubjective discount factor is ξ<1. In
terms of timing, an altruistic household born at t receives inheritance it as it begins its ﬁrst
period of life; it then chooses its ﬁrst period of life consumption, say, cd
1t, and saving, say,
sd
1t; as its second period of life begins, its wealth plus interest is Rt+1 · sd
1t, and it divides
this sum between a bequest it+1 to its grown child and its own retirement consumption
cd
2t.
A dynasty’s ﬁrst–order condition for it+1 is
u2(it,i t+1,W t,R t+1)+ξ · u1(it+1,i t+2,W t+1,R t+2) ≤ 0a ll t,




1t) ≥ ξ · v (cd
1,t+1), equality for it+1 > 0.
Or, since utility is logarithmic,
cd
1,t+1 ≥ Rt+1 · ξ · cd
1t, equality for it+1 > 0. (7)
As stated, altruistic parents beget altruistic children, while children with nonaltruistic
parents are themselves nonaltruistic.
For a dynastic household started at t, saving carried from youth to old age, sd
1t,i st h e
sum of two components. One is life–cycle saving, given by θ times the right–hand side of
(2). The other is estate–motivated saving. Combining them,
sd







Our analysis assumes that in the initial time period, each dynastic household receives
the same inheritance. Given identicalpreferences and earnings, one dynasty’s subsequent
bequests are the same as another’s.4
Let the totalnet assets which the househol d sector carries from time t to t +1b e
At+1. Then letting the total number of households initiated at each date be N, accounting
implies
At+1 = N · (1 − λ) · s1t + N · λ · sd
1t. (9)
Production Sector. The economy has an aggregate production function
Qt =[ Kt]α · [Et]1−α,α ∈ (0,1),
where Q is GDP, K is the aggregate capitalstock, and E is the “eﬀective” labor supply.
The latter is
Et = N · gt. (10)
GDP is homogeneously divisible into consumption and investment goods. All capital which
ﬁrms use at time t + 1 must have been built in prior periods and ﬁnanced from t to t +1 .
Letting µ be the rate of physicaldepreciation, competitive behavior yiel ds
Rt =1+α · [Kt]α−1 · [Et]1−α − µ and Wt =( 1− α) · [Kt]α · [Et]−α. (11)
4 In the steady–state analysis below, diﬀerences among dynastic households are not
interesting since the initialdistribution of inheritances remains unchanged forever. The
distribution would change somewhat, on the other hand, during transitions between steady
states (Caselli and Ventura, 1996). See also Section 6.
5GeneralEquil ibrium . Assume that the economy is closed and, at this point, that there is
no government sector. Then household net worth must exactly ﬁnance the physical capital
stock. In other words,
At = Kt all t. (12)
2. Steady–State Growth
Deﬁne a steady state equilibrium (an SSE) to be an equilibrium for the economy with
(i) a constant interest factor R and (ii) geometric growth at constant rates for Q, K, E,
and W. Condition (11) immediately shows that Kt/Et and Wt must be constant if Rt is,
and (10) shows that E has growth factor g;t h u s ,Kt and Qt have steady–state growth
factor g. It remains to ﬁnd the constant value(s) of R at which saving and investment —
or the stock of wealth and the stock of capital — are equal. We study the last condition
using a picture (as in Tobin (1967)).
Fig. 1 considers the steady states of a purely life–cycle economy (i.e., λ = 0). With







The latter determines the “household wealth supply curve,” Fig. 1’s H–curve.
The downward sloping “production sector curve,” the P–curve in Fig. 1, comes from
the aggregate production function and deﬁnition of an SSE. In a steady state, Wt = W,
Rt = R,a n dKt+1 = g · Kt all t; combining these with (11), for any SSE
Kt+1 · (R + µ − 1)
W · Et
= g ·













R + µ − 1
. (14)
Generalequil ibrium requires Kt+1 = At+1; so, for an SSE we must be at the intersec-
tion e of H and P in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 shows there is a unique SSE when λ =0 .
Fig. 1: The SSE demand (P) and supply (H) of wealth in the pure life–cycle case
6Turning to the more generalmodelwith some dynastic househol ds (i.e., λ>0), we
ﬁrst examine the time trend of inheritances. In a steady state, K and Q grow with factor
g. To maintain the capitalstock, time– t gross investment must then equal( g−1+µ)·Kt,
which grows with factor g. Since national output equals consumption plus investment,
consumption must also have steady–state growth factor g. Line (4) shows that life–cycle
consumption has this growth factor as well; hence, using the second half of (4) ﬁrst, cd
1t
and cd
2t do too. Looking at (7), we can then see that in any SSE,
g ≥ R · ξ.
There are two cases. Either
g>R· ξ, (15)
in which event the ﬁrst order condition for i requires it+1 =0a ll t;o r ,
g = R · ξ, (16)
in which case it+1 can be positive. As stated, dynastic consumption has growth factor g
in an SSE. The present value of a dynasty’s consumption from date t + 1 forward equals
R ·sd
1t plus the present value of current and future earnings. Earnings grow with factor g;
hence, sd
1t grows with factor g. The accounting relation
cd
2t + it+1 = R · sd
1t
then shows that in an SSE,
it = i0 · gt all t. (17)
Collecting these characterizations, and noting that our dynastic results hold trivially
in a steady state with zero inheritances (i.e., in a steady state with (15) instead of (16)),
Proposition 1: In any SSE, cd
1t, cd
2t, c1t, c2t, s1t, sd
1t,a n dit m u s tg r o wa tr a t eg − 1.
In a SSE with positive inheritances, equality (16) must hold. In a SSE without positive
inheritances, provided there are at least some dynastic households, inequality (15) must
hold.
In other words, in a steady state, dynasties behave exactly in accordance with the perma-
nent income hypothesis: during its lifetime, each dynastic household consumes its earnings
plus R·it−g·it, the interest on its inheritance less what is needed to maintain the magni-
tude of the latter’s principal relative to future earnings. This description applies regardless
of the magnitude of i0.
Fig. 2 graphs the steady–state wealth supply curve H for an economy with λ>0. For
a steady state, (8)–(9) and (17) yield
At+1
W · Et
=( 1− λ) · θ + λ · [θ · (1 +
i0
W






]e v e r yt. (18)
If i0 =0 ,w h i c hm u s tb et h ec a s ef o rR<g / ξ , there are only life–cycle wealth accumu-
lations, and the curve resembles Fig. 1, with the right–hand side of (18) equaling θ.I f
7R = g/ξ, diﬀerent values of i0 yield the horizontal segment in the H curve — as (18)
shows, a larger i0 moves us further to the right; as the preceding paragraph notes, any i0
is compatible with equilibrium behavior.
Continuing to refer to Fig. 2, when the production–sector curve is ¯ P, crossing H below
R = g/ξ, there exists a unique SSE at ¯ e with no inheritances or bequests. If the demand
curve is P, there is a unique SSE at e. In the latter case, the horizontal coordinate at f
gives the life–cycle saving contribution to total wealth accumulation, and the horizontal
diﬀerence between e and f measures the contribution of bequest–motivated saving. These
are the only two possible outcomes.
Fig. 2: The SSE demand and supply of wealth with dynastic saving
Summarizing,
Proposition 2: Assume logarithmic utility and λ>0. Then if an SSE with positive
inheritances exists, it is unique and the steady–state interest rate is R = g/ξ.I fn os u c h
SSE exists, there is a unique steady state with only life–cycle saving, R<g / ξ .
In the more generalisoel astic case from (3), the verticalsegment of H would instead
have a slope — positive if γ>0, and negative if γ<0. The section to the right of f would
still be ﬂat, but its height would be the root R of
(R · ξ)1/(1−γ) = g.
The analysis would otherwise be the same.
Suppose we measure the degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth with a Gini
coeﬃcient. Think about the end of period t, households having had time to complete
their current labor and consumption, and elderly households to make bequests. Then
all N elderly households have 0 net worth; the (1 − λ) · N middle–of–life nondynastic
households each have net worth s1t;a n dt h eλ·N middle–of–life dynastic households each
have sd
1t ≥ s1t. Fig. 3 shows the Lorenz curve, ABFE.F r o mA to B, a distance of 1/2,
we have the elderly; from B to C, a distance of (1 − λ)/2, the middle–of–life nondynastic
households; and, from C to D, a distance of λ/2, the middle–of–life dynastic households.
With either λ =0o rλ = 1, the Gini coeﬃcient would equal twice the area of triangle
ABE; thus, the Gini would be 1/2. For other values of λ, we must add twice the shaded
area. The shaded area equals
81
2
· FG· [BC + CD]=
1
2







Since the slope of BE is 2, CG =1−λ. The height of F gives the fraction of totalweal th
held by middle–of–life nondynastic households; hence,
FG=( 1− λ) −
(1 − λ) · s1t
(1 − λ) · s1t + λ · sd
1t
.






· (1 − λ) ·
(1 − λ) · s1t + λ · sd
1t − s1t
(1 − λ) · s1t + λ · sd
1t
. (19)
Referring back to Fig. 2, let ex be the x–coordinate of equilibrium point e,a n dle t fx be
the x–coordinate of point f. Equilibrium condition (12) shows
ex =
[(1 − λ) · s1t + λ · sd
1t] · N


















Notice that the (steady–state ) Gini is not dependent on time.
Fig. 3: The Lorenz curve (ABFE) for the cross–sectionaldistribution of weal th
The intuition for (20) is clear. Dynastic households have higher net worth than purely
life–cycle households because the former save to maintain their family line’s wealth as well
as for their own retirement, while the latter save just for retirement. The distance between
f and e in Fig. 2 shows the margin by which aggregate wealth exceeds accumulation in
9a purely life–cycle economy. For a given λ, the more dynastic wealth which equilibrium
requires, the wider the margin between e and f, and the more overall wealth inequality. For
a given percentage margin of ex over fx,alo w e r λ implies a smaller subset of households
provides the requisite extra wealth, so that each of the latter households must be richer,
and the degree of inequality correspondingly greater.
Summarizing,
Proposition 3: Suppose our model has a SSE with positive bequests, as at point e in
Fig. 2. Then (20) gives the Gini coeﬃcient for wealth inequality at the close of each
period. In a SSE, the Gini is time–invariant.
3. Longer Lives
Darby’s (1979) tables 1–2 show that the probability of surviving to 65 has increased
substantially in the last century, as have expected remaining life spans for individuals
surviving to 65. In terms of our life–cycle model, these factors presumably raise θ,w h i c h
determines the fraction of lifetime consumption that households allocate to retirement.
This section examines the implications of such a change.
A larger θ increases the life–cycle wealth accumulation of young households. In terms
of Fig. 2, the verticalsection of the H curve shifts to the right. On the other hand, θ
plays no role in (16), which determines the height of the H–curve’s ﬂat section. So, the
ﬂat section’s height is unchanged. Fig. 4 illustrates. If the old SSE was at ¯ e,w i t hn o
inheritances, the new one, shown as ¯ ¯ e, has a lower interest rate and higher capital–to–
labor ratio. If, however, the old SSE was e, and if the increase in θ is not too big, the new
steady state lies again at e, with the same interest rate and capitalintensivity. The l atter
is the case of interest in this paper.
Fig. 4: The H–curve shifts because of an increase in longevity
At e,w h e nθ rises, the distribution of wealth becomes more equal. Fix λ>0. As
life–cycle saving increases with a rise in θ, the verticalpart of H, and with it point f,s h i f t s
to the right. Proposition 3 shows that as this happens, the Gini coeﬃcient for wealth falls:
dynastic wealth holdings adjust to restore (16); when demographic changes raise life–cycle
accumulations, the equilibrium extra net worth that dynastic households carry for bequests
falls — and the latter is the important source of the economy’s wealth inequality.
10Summarizing,
Proposition 4: Suppose our model has a SSE with positive bequests. Then an in-
crease in θ suﬃciently small to allow a new SSE with positive bequests leaves the steady–
state interest rate and the capital–to–eﬀective labor ratio unchanged. However, the distri-
bution of wealth becomes more equal.
Darby attacks the life–cycle model on the basis of demographic changes: if saving is
explained by the life–cycle model, the economy’s capital intensity, he argues, should have
risen substantially over the course of the last century as longevity increased. He is thinking
of the pure life–cycle equilibrium, ¯ e,i nF i g .4 . A te, on the other hand, with both life–
cycle and bequest–motivated saving, increasing longevity raises the relative importance of
life–cycle saving, though not, in the long run, the size of the overall capital stock or the
steady–state interest rate.
Going further, Wolﬀ and Atkinson ﬁnd a secular decline in empirical cross–sectional
wealth inequality, and Proposition 4 suggests an unexpected connection to Darby’s anal-
ysis: if increases in longevity have made life–cycle saving progressively more important,
they may simultaneously have reduced the disequalizing role of inheritances. Section 6
shows the possible quantitative importance of this point.
Although we could examine the adjustment path from the old SSE to the new one
after a change in θ, we postpone our discussion of dynamic analysis until Section 4.
4. Government Debt and Social Security
Wolﬀ’s U.S. data not only shows a secular decline in wealth inequality but also a
recent upturn, and this section suggests one possible explanation for the latter: government
policies may inadvertently have increased the relative weight of dynastic savings.5 Since
the U.S. socialsecurity system’s inception in the 1930s, beneﬁts (and taxes) have risen
as periods of retirement became longer and more prevalent, as the system expanded to
include a larger fraction of the workforce, and as Congress raised statutory beneﬁts. It is
also the case that the U.S. national debt rose very rapidly in the early 1940s, and, after
a period of gradual decline, rapidly again in the 1980s. Our model predicts that growth
either in public debt or in the size of an unfunded social security system will, cet. par.,
tend to increase wealth inequality among households.
Consider ﬁrst an unfunded socialsecurity system which taxes l abor earnings in order
to pay beneﬁts to retirees. Let the tax be a proportion τss of earnings. The right–hand
side of household budget (2) becomes







The ﬁrst term has been modiﬁed to reﬂect socialsecurity taxes; the second term, which is
new, registers socialsecurity beneﬁts. Assuming a steady state, and sol ving for the saving
of a young, purely life–cycle household,
5 The equations in this section and results on aggregative capital accumulation closely
resemble Michel and Pestieau (1998) — though the discussion of distributions does not.
11s1t







The ﬁrst right–hand side term reﬂects private provision for retirement consumption; the
second term reﬂects the fact that households now receive external resources during retire-
ment. Line (16) shows that g/R = ξ<1 for an SSE with positive inheritances; therefore,
the ﬁrst right–hand side term in (21) is smaller than θ. The reduction is due to an income
eﬀect: at equilibrium interest factor R, the present value of a household’s social security
beneﬁts fall short of its taxes, leading to less consumption in both periods of life, and hence
less youthful saving. The second right–hand side term of (21) comes from the intertempo-
raltransfers from earning years to retirement inherent in socialsecurity. These, of course,
displace life–cycle saving.


























Since condition (16) is unchanged, the ﬂat part of the H curve in Fig. 2 remains at
the same height. Lines (21)–(22) show the verticalsection shifts l eft (and it now assumes a
positive slope due to the presence of R on the right–hand side of (21)). The demand curve
remains unchanged. Thus, Proposition 3 shows that with positive inheritances, wealth
inequality should increase when τss does.6
Increases in the nationaldebt can have the same eﬀect. Suppose one–period bonds
fund a government debt of size Bt = B0 · gt at time t,w i t hBt being the stock of bonds
expiring at t, and that society levies lump–sum taxes of τt = τ0 · gt on young households
to fund the debt’s interest liability. The net worth which a nonaltruistic household carries
into retirement is
s1t = θ · [Wt · g
t − τt];
the net worth for altruistic households of the same age is
sd
1t = θ · [Wt · gt + it − τt]+




Bt+1 − Bt + N · τt =( Rt − 1) · Bt . (23)
Equilibrium requires
6 This paper’s simpliﬁed model overlooks, of course, possible labor supply eﬀects from
social security taxes. It also follows most existing work in focusing on the equality of the
distribution of private wealth (i.e., wealth excluding capitalized social security beneﬁts).
Line (21) implies that the direction of our outcome would not change if we incorporated
capitalized social security beneﬁts into life–cycle wealth.
12N · (1 − λ) · st + N · λ · sd
t = Bt+1 + Kt+1. (24)
Fig. 5 provides a picture. We change from a SSE with no government debt — having
supply curve Hold — to a new SSE with B0 > 0. As g/ξ > g, along the horizontal section
of the H curve government debt requires positive taxes (see (23)). The latter reduce life–
cycle saving, sliding point f to the left. The P curve shifts right as we add Bt+1/Wt · Et
to Kt+1/Wt · Et. The new SSE, assuming positive bequests, is e. Again, Proposition 3
shows that wealth inequality rises as B0 does, because e and f spread further apart.
Fig. 5: The eﬀect of a nationaldebt on the economy’s SSE
Summarizing,
Proposition 5: Consider a steady state for our model with positive bequests. Then a
small increase in social security beneﬁts or in national debt (with taxes for debt service
falling exclusively on young households) will leave the steady–state interest rate unchanged
but will increase wealth inequality.
For all of the changes which we consider, our model allows short–run analysis as well
as a comparison of steady states. Fig. 6 illustrates a transition path following an increase
in national debt. The experiment is as follows: at time 0 upon retiring bonds B0,t h e
government issues 1% more B1 than the trend increase to g · B0, announcing that future
debt will be Bt = B1·gt−1, and using the extra time–0 sales revenues for a one–period tax
reduction. Prior to time 0, the economy rested in a SSE. Fig. 6 graphs adjustment paths
to the new steady state for physicalcapital Kt, the interest rate, the dynastic inheritance
it, and the wealth Gini, presenting percent deviations from original steady–state values.
Parameters are α = .33, ξ = .75, θ = .50, λ = .05, µ = .20, g =1 .08, N =1 ,a n d
B0 = .10. The initialSSE resembl es e in Fig. 4–5. Steady–state levels are K0 = .37,
s10 = .22, sd
10 =5 .95, and i0 =6 .54. Despite the fact that they compose only about
5% of the population of family lines, dynastic savers hold roughly 63% of the economy’s
stock of capital and bonds. Middle–of–life dynastic households have over 26 times as much
net worth as nondynastic households of the same age. The initial Gini coeﬃcient for the
cross–sectionaldistribution of weal th is .77.
We can determine dynamic behavior from accounting and ﬁrst–order conditions; this
paper’s appendix provides details. The adjustment path is interesting. At time 0, the tax
13reduction for young households increases life–cycle and, to a lesser extent, dynastic saving.
The wealth Gini falls, and the time–1 capital stock rises. At time 1 the tax reduction
is over; taxes, in fact, are above their originall evelbecause the nationaldebt is l arger.
Life–cycle saving falls. Dynastic saving is temporarily low as well because the high capital
stock lowers the return on assets. The capital stock falls sharply. Resulting higher interest
rates raise subsequent dynastic saving and inheritances. As in Fig. 5, dynastic wealth
accumulation eventually restores the capital stock to its original level — despite the larger
national debt and permanently lower life–cycle saving. The ﬁnal Gini is about .08% higher
than prior to the policy change.
In addition to showing that our model can be saddlepoint stable with rational expecta-
tions, the dynamic example illustrates a diﬀerence between our model and Barro’s (1974)
well–known analysis. Both predict that changes in national debt or social security will
leave the long–run interest rate and capital intensivity of the economy unaﬀected. How-
ever, in Barro’s framework such policy changes make no diﬀerence in the short run either.
Following an increase in the national debt, for instance, households perceive greater future
tax liabilities, and all raise their savings accordingly, providing just enough incremental ﬁ-
nancing to preserve the old interest rate. In contrast, in this paper’s model only a fraction
of households are dynastic. Although dynastic families respond analogously to Barro’s,
purely life–cycle households do not. The impact on saving is, in eﬀect, only λ times as
much as in Barro’s model . In the short run, physicalcapitalis crowded out and interest
rates rise. The latter induces dynastic households to go further, accumulating additional
wealth until the old equilibrium interest factor reemerges. The extra eﬀorts of dynastic
households permanently change our model’s distribution of wealth.
5. Slower Growth
The rate of technological progress in the United States and Western Europe seemed to
slow down after 1970, and we might ask how according to our model that will, eventually
at least, aﬀect the distribution of wealth. This section shows our simple model predicts
that slower growth implies higher steady–state wealth inequality.
Fig. 7: The eﬀect of slower technological change on the economy’s SSE
14If g falls, production relation (14) shows that the demand for capital curve shifts to
the left — from P old to P in Fig. 7 — leading, cet. par., to lower wealth inequality.
Intuitively, to sustain a steady state, the economy must provide enough saving for the
capital stock to grow in step with the eﬀective labor supply; when g is lower, this is
more easily accomplished, requiring less dynastic saving. However, if g falls, (16) shows R
and the corresponding ﬂat section of our household wealth supply curve will fall as well.
In other words, a benefactor requires less inducement to bequeath to descendants whose
consumption opportunities are growing less rapidly. This leads to a higher capital to labor
ratio, shifting the equilibrium point to the right, and tending to increase the inequality of
wealth holdings.
On balance, in our simple model a lower g leads to more steady–state wealth inequality.
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In terms of Fig. 7, this means that following a decline in g, the new equilibrium, e ,m u s t
be to the right of the old one, e. Equation (20) then shows the Gini must increase.
Summarizing,
Proposition 6: Consider a steady state for our model with positive bequests. Then
as m a l ld e c r e a s ei ng will cause the steady–state interest rate to fall and the degree of
inequality in the cross–sectional distribution of wealth to rise.
Proposition 6, of course, presents comparisons of steady–state equilibria. The recent
changes in Wolﬀ’s data mentioned in the introduction may be too soon after the 1970
slowdown for Proposition 6 to be applicable.7
It is also true that the calculations for Proposition 6 appear more fragile than Propo-
sitions 4–5. On the one hand, the size of γ in utility function (3) becomes important. As
stated above, the verticalsection of the H curve assumes a negative slope if γ<0—w h i c h
is often thought to be the realistic case in practice. With γ<0, as g and R fall, life–cycle
wealth accumulations climb, creating a tendency toward wealth equalization not evident
in Fig. 7. Further complications arise with multiperiod life spans. One issue is that in
a framework with longer lives, households of many diﬀerent ages would have positive net
worth, and technological progress essentially gives those born the most recently the most
weight in computing aggregates. Depending on the precise nature of the distribution of
wealth with respect to age, faster technological progress then could either raise or lower
7 As in simpler growth models, a diminution of g also implies a higher SSE average
propensity to save — which is certainly not evident in the U.S. national income and
products account data. Possibly the slowdown is too recent for the economy to have
achieved a new steady state. Or, other factors beyond the scope of this paper, such as the
tremendous rise in common stock prices, may have played a role.
15average life–cycle wealth. A second issue arising when there are multiperiod life spans is
that slower technological change ﬂattens each household’s life–cycle earnings proﬁle. A
ﬂatter proﬁle causes households to begin saving for retirement earlier, tending to increase
average life–cycle net worth. Again, predictions from our simple model may not be reliable.
6. Calibrated Examples
This section develops a calibrated version of our model and examines the theoretical
implications of Sections 2–5 from a quantitative standpoint. Since length of life is impor-
tant to numerical outcomes, the examples allow multiperiod life spans and provide a rather
detailed treatment of mortality. However, all of the analysis assumes the availability of
actuarially fair annuities and life insurance. And, for the sake of computational simplicity,
we limit our attention to steady–state equilibria.
Model. Time is discrete. Let n be the annualpopul ation growth factor. Assume each
household begins with a single adult age 20 and raises n20 children. The children remain
under their parent’s care untilage 20, at which point they form their own househol ds.
There is no child mortality. The fraction of adults remaining alive at age s ≥ 20 is qs,a n d
the probability that an adult dies at the close of age s is
ps+1 =( qs − qs+1)/qs.
The maximalage is 99.
To generate a distribution of wealth among life–cycle and among dynastic households,
we assume an exogenous, stationary distribution of earning abilities within each cohort.
The earnings distribution is the same for dynastic and nondynastic households. Each
adult has a (known) earning ability x, constant throughout his life. For simplicity, all
descendants of an adult have the same ability that he does.8 Let the density for the
distribution of x be f(x). In fact, we assume
ln(x) ∼ N(0,σ2
x). (25)
We continue to assume that labor hours are inelastic. Letting es be the product of experien-
tialhuman capitaland l abor hours, and g be one plus the rate of annual labor–augmenting
technological progress, an adult of age s, ability x, and birth date t supplies es · x · gt+s
“eﬀective” labor units. In our steady–state equilibria, the wage per eﬀective labor unit is
constant, Wt = W, as is the interest rate, rt = r,t h ei n c o m et a xr a t eτ,a n dt h es o c i a l
security tax rate τss.
The simulation model’s equations are as follows. Letting V (a,s,0,x) be remaining
lifetime utility for a household born at time 0, currently age s (20 ≤ s ≤ 99), having
earning ability x, and beginning period s with net worth a,w eh a v e
8 This assumption preserves the simplicity of deterministic analysis for dynastic be-
havior. For alternative approaches, see, for instance, Laitner (1992), Fuster (1998), or
Nishiyama (2000).
16V (a,s,0,x)= m a x
cs,cks, s
{u(cs,s)+n20 · uk(cks,s)+ps+1 · n20 · U( s,s)+
β · (1 − ps+1) · V (a ,s+1 ,0,x)} (26)
with




a  ≥ 0, (28)
where cs is the consumption of the household’s adult and u(cs,s) the corresponding ﬂow
of utility; where cks measures the consumption of each of the household’s minor children
when the adult is age s =2 0 ,...,39, and uk(cks,s) is the corresponding addition to the
parent’s utility ﬂow from each minor child; where  s is the term life insurance which the
parent purchases at ages s =2 0 ,...,38 to protect each minor child, and U( s,s)m e a s u r e s
the (parent) household’s utility from the minor child’s consumption if the adult dies at
the close of age s;w h e r eβ is the subjective discount factor for lifetime utility; where
ssbs(0,x) is socialsecurity retirement beneﬁts, hal f of which are taxed ; and, where Rs is
the net–of–tax interest factor for annuities,
Rs ≡
1+r · (1 − τ)
qs+1/qs
.
We assume that bankruptcy laws prevent households from borrowing without collateral,





γ , if s ≤ 65,
υ1−γ · c
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γ , if 20 ≤ s ≤ 39,
0, if s ≥ 40,
with γ<1. We discuss the relative weights for retirement consumption, υ, and minor
children, ω, below. Deﬁne
R ≡ 1+r · (1 − τ).
For 20 ≤ s<39,












For ages s ≥ 39, an adult need no longer buy life insurance to protect his minor children,
and U(.,s)=0 .
The framework of (26)–(28) applies to all households. For those which are nondynas-
tic, letting a(s,t,x) be the beginning–of–period net worth of a household born at t and
currently age s,w ei m p o s e
a(20,t,x)=0 a n d a(100,t,x)=0 . (29)
Note that because preferences are homothetic, when R and W are constant, solution of
the analogue of (26)–(29) for t  =0y i e ld s
a(s,t,x)=gt · a(s,0,x)a n dV (gt · a,s,t,x)=gγ·t · V (a,s,0,x). (30)
Nondynastic households solve (26)–(28) and simultaneously determine inheritances
from an intergenerational maximization problem. Consider a dynastic household with
adult born at t. Labelthis househol d “generation 0” in the dynasty. If the present






(ξ · n20)j · V (ij − n20 · ij+1/R20,20,t+2 0· j,x), (31)
with ξ the intergenerationalsubjective discount factor. 9 Let ad(s,t,x) be the beginning–
of–period net worth of a dynastic household born at t and currently age s.A tt h i sp o i n t ,
we will think of a minor child as receiving the present value of his inheritance at birth
(though he cannot begin his own consumption until he is an adult); thus, following the
notation of (31),
a
d(s,t +2 0· j,x)=ij · R
s−20 for s =0 ,...,20, and a
d(100,t+2 0· j,x)=0 . (32)
As in previous sections, the fraction of households which are dynastic is an exogenous
constant λ.
There is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate production function
Qt =[ Kt]α · [Et]1−α,α ∈ (0,1),
9 There are no estate taxes in the model. The U.S. estate tax has a very high credit, so
that only a tiny minority of estates are liable.
18where Qt is GDP, Kt is the aggregate stock of privately owned physical capital excluding
consumer durables, and Et is the eﬀective labor force. Kt depreciates at rate µ.T h e
economy is closed. The price of output is always 1. Perfect competition implies
Wt =( 1− α) ·
Qt
Et




Households also own a stock of consumer durables, KD
t . The stock yields a proportion-
ate service ﬂow. In turn, households demand a service ﬂow which is a ﬁxed proportion of
their total consumption. Hence, as our analysis is limited to steady states, our calibrations
assume
KD
t /Qt = constant.
The government issues Bt one–period bonds with price 1 at time t. We assume
Bt/Qt = constant.
Letting SSBt be aggregate socialsecurity beneﬁts, we assume
SSBt/Qt = constant.
The socialsecurity system is unfunded, so
SSBt = τss · Wt · Et. (34)
If Gt is government spending on public consumption goods, we assume
Gt/Qt = constant.
The government budget constraint is
Gt + rt · Bt + Bt = τ · [Wt · Et + rt · Kt + rt · Bt]+Bt+1. (35)
Public–good consumption does not aﬀect marginal rates of substitution for private con-
sumption.





n(t−s) · gt · qs · es. (36)








(t−s) · qs ·
 ∞
−∞
[(1 − λ) · a(s,t − s,x)+λ · a
d(s,t − s,x)] · f(x)dx. (37)
19In “equilibrium” all households maximize their utility and (33)–(37) hold. A “steady–
state equilibrium (SSE)” is an equilibrium in which rt and Wt are constant all t and in
which Q, K,a n dE grow geometrically with factor g · n. As stated, this section focuses
exclusively on steady–state equilibria.
Calibration. Table 1 presents our mortality and labor supply data. We use two schedules
for qs, one averaging 1995 United States mortality rates for men and women, and a second
based on 1920 rates.10 Column 4 provides recent data on relative earnings at diﬀerent
ages. Columns 5–6 multiply column 4 by participation rates. We set es for our “1995” and
“1920” simulations from columns 5–6. Notice that while survival rates past age 65 were
much lower in 1920, participation rates among survivors were much higher. Notice also
that the relative es for diﬀerent ages within columns 5–6 make a diﬀerence in this paper,
but the absolute levels do not.11
Table 2 presents base–case values for other parameters. Labor’s share of output equals
1−α. Letting 1995 wages and salaries from The Economic Report of the President (1999)
be A, proprietor’s incomes be B,a n da ll i n c o m eb e C,w ed e r i v eα from
1 − α =
A +( 1− α) · B
C
.
The realinterest rate impl ied by Huggett’s (1996) capitalshare, empiricalcapital –to–
output ratio, and depreciation rate is .06. According to (33),




Using the 1995 GDP and stock of business inventories from T h eE c o n o m i cR e p o r to ft h e
President (1999), and combining the inventory stock with the 1995 ﬁxed private capital
stock from The Survey of Current Business (1997, p.38), the formula above yields r1995 =
1.059 if we set µ = .08. The latter is our choice in Table 2. KD
t /Qt for 1995 comes from
the same two sources; for 1920, the GDP comes from Historical Statistics of the United
States (1975) (and the stock of durables is extrapolated from 1925).
We employ one value of n reﬂecting U.S. Census data for 1970–90, and a second based
on 1900–1920. The rate of technological progress has ﬂuctuated during the century, and
our base–case models simply set our progress factor, g, to 1.01.
In Huggett (1996), each household’s x changes from year to year. Using his initialand
annualshocks and autocorrel ation and our 1995 es, n,a n dg, one can simulate the U.S.
earnings distribution. Using our es, n, g, and employing this paper’s assumption that each
adult’s x is constant throughout his life, for each σ2
x (recall (25)) we can generate a second
simulated distribution. Table 2’s σ2
x equates the Gini coeﬃcient for the second simulated
distribution to Huggett’s.
10 According to these ﬁgures, life expectancy at age 20 in 1995 was 75.8, whereas in 1920
it was 64.1.
11 One could speculate that lifetime earnings proﬁles were ﬂatter in 1920 than 1995
because of lower education attainment. That would have tended to narrow diﬀerences in
life–cycle saving between the two periods — but it is not taken into account in this paper.
20Table 2’s aggregative social security beneﬁts come from Social Security Bulletin (1997,
p.61). The corresponding 1995 tax rate (see (34)) is τss = .061.12 The U.S. had no social
security system in 1920. Bt and Gt for 1995 come from The Economic Report of the
President (1999), referring to Federaldebt and spending, respectivel y; for 1920 they come
(with extrapolation when necessary) from Historical Statistics of the United States (1975).
We derive tax rate τ from (35); in the 1995 base case it is .237, and for 1920 it is .108.
Table 2’s γ comes from Huggett (1996). (As this parameter serves mainly to scale β
in our setup, we do not present simulations below for alternative values of it.) Recalling
utility functions u(cs,s)a n duk(cks,s), ﬁrst–order conditions show that a retiree will have
υ times as much consumption as a nonretiree, cet. par., and a minor child will have ω
times as much consumption as his parent. Retirees tend to have lower consumption needs
(not having work–related expense for clothing and transportation, being able to consume
services at oﬀ–peak hours, etc.). For example, a recent TIAA–CREF brochure suggests
“you’ll need 60 to 90 percent of your current income in retirement, adjusted for inﬂation, to
maintain the lifestyle you now lead”; a recent Reader’s Digest article on retirement planning
states, “Many ﬁnancial planners say it will take 70 to 80 percent of your current income
to maintain your standard of living when you retire”; and, Mariger (1986) econometrically
estimates that individual consumption falls 50% at retirement. Our base case sets υ = .75.
Tobin (1967) suggests values for ω ranging from .2 to .7; Mariger’s (1986) point estimate
is ω = .3; and, empirically derived scales for consumption needs of 4–person households
relative to 2–person in Burkhauser et al. (1996) suggest ratios of 1.34–1.42. Our base case
follows Mariger.
Turning to β, the ﬁrst–order condition for adult consumption at consecutive ages
yields
(β · R)1/(1−γ) · cs ≤ cs+1, (38)
with equality when the liquidity constraint a  ≥ 0 does not bind. Tables from the 1984–97
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (see http://stats.bls.gov/csxhome.htm) provide data
on consumption at diﬀerent ages. Since the survey does not impute service ﬂows to owner
occupied houses, for each year we scale survey amounts (less mortgages and repairs on
owner occupied houses) to NIPA aggregate consumption minus aggregate housing service
ﬂows for owner occupied houses, then we allocate the NIPA aggregate service ﬂow from
owner occupied houses to survey age brackets in proportion to average housing values
within the brackets (as given in the survey).13 Finally, we extrapolate to individual ages
and convert to constant dollars with the NIPA personal consumption deﬂator. The average
ratio of time–(t+1) household consumption at age s+1 to time–t consumption at age s for
households of age 30–39 is 1.0257 — where we include only these ages out of fear that in
practice liquidity constraints bind for earlier ages and minor children begin leaving home
12 Note that our social security beneﬁts refer only to old–age and survivors insurance,
not to disability insurance.
13 Another potentialprobl em, of course, is that the survey measures purchases of con-
sumer durables rather than service ﬂows from them. See, for example, Modigliani (1988).
21at later ages.14 Recalling (38), our base–case β follows from
(β · R)1/(1−γ) =1 .0257,
where R =1+r · (1 − τ)w i t hr = r1995 = .059, τ = τ1995 = .237, and we disregard (at
this point) mortality.
Sections 2–5 and the envelope theorem show that a steady state with positive inheri-
tances requires
R20 · ξ · g(γ−1)·20 =1 . (39)
Our base–case simulations compute ξ = .5588 from this formula using R =1+.059 · (1 −
.237) and g =1 .01.15
For future reference, the last rows of Table 2 display 1995 ratios of aggregative house-
hold net worth to total factor payments for labor, and private capital other than consumer
durables to GDP, using the data sources explained above.
Simulations. Tables 3–5 present simulation results.
The computational steps for row 1 of Tables 3–4 is as follows. (i) Compute r and
W from (33), assuming Table 2’s empirical Kt/Qt. (ii) After dividing (35) through by
Qt, one can deduce τ. (iii) Then solve the life–cycle problem of a nondynastic household
with x = 1. Because of homothetic preferences, diﬀerent x values aﬀect net worth at all
ages proportionately. Taking a ratio of average cross–sectional nondynastic net worth to
average eﬀective labor, compare with the second to the last row of Table 2 to compute the
nondynastic share of totalprivate weal th. (iv) For any choice of λ, dynastic wealth supplies
the remaining part of totalweal th, and we can compute the cross–sectionaldistribution of
wealth, including nondynastic and dynastic households. Huggett (1996) and Wolﬀ (1987)
suggest the Gini coeﬃcient for the actual U.S. distribution of wealth in the late 1980s was
.72, the share of the top 1% of wealth holders was .28, and the share of the top 5% was
.49. We compute the λ such that the sum of squared deviations between the simulated
and actual values of the latter three statistics is minimized. Table 3 reports the λ,a n d
Table 4 presents distributional outcomes.
There are two additional details in our simulations of the distribution of wealth.
First, our algorithm must specify the age at which dynastic intergenerational transfers
actually take place — though this makes no diﬀerence to aggregate wealth, it does aﬀect
distributionalstatistics. Laitner (1997) argues that parents may withhol d their transfers
as long as possible to reduce children’s scope for strategic behavior (for instance, spending
their transfer and asking for more). Our computations follow that spirit. For each dynastic
household, trace the oldest surviving ancestor, “the patriarch.” Assume that he holds the
14 For comparison, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ’s (1987, ﬁg.5.2) consumption has an average
growth factor of about 1.0105, and Huggett’s (1996) factor ranges from 1.017 to 1.035,
depending on one’s choice of γ. With our 1.0257 factor, consumption is 2.4 times as large
at age 65 as at age 30.
15 Using a somewhat diﬀerent model, Nishiyama (2000, table 8–9) derives estimates .51
and .58 for a parameter analogous to ξ/β20 = .63 in the present paper.
22dynasty’s wealth. On the birth of each descendant, he creates a “trust” account in that
descendant’s name, funding it with the present value of the amount the descendant will
inherit less what the descendent himself will bequeath, and annuitizing on the recipient’s
life. Each year the account makes the minimal inter vivos transfers to the descendant
necessary for him to implement his lifetime consumption program derived from (26)–(28).
When the patriarch dies, the balances for all trust accounts pass to the oldest surviving
descendants in each line radiating from the patriarch. The model’s distribution of wealth
reﬂects this: as long as a parent, for example, holds trust accounts for his children, the
balances of the accounts are counted as part of the parent’s (rather than the children’s) net
worth. Analogously, the parent himself does not inherit the principal of his own inheritance
untilhis parents, grandparents, and great grandparents are deceased.
Second, although the model fully determines the SSE distribution of wealth among
nondynastic households, the distribution of dynastic wealth — though not its aggregate
amount — is indeterminate. This section assumes that the distribution of wealth among
dynastic households of each age is proportional to their “abilities.” This is strictly anal-
ogous to Sections 2–5: the dynastic wealth distribution there was indeterminate, but we
assumed that all — having the same ability — had the same wealth.
For row 1 of Table 3, nondynastic households explain about 68% of the economy’s
total wealth. As in Huggett (1996), the distribution of nondynastic wealth matches the
empiricalGini quite wel lbut understates the concentration at the top of the distribution
by a wide margin — see Table 4. When we add dynastic households, the match with the
upper tail is very close, although the Gini overshoots its corresponding actual value. The
fraction of dynastic households yielding the best ﬁt is quite low, λ = .083. Table 3 shows
that the dynastic households have on average almost 7 times as much net worth as purely
life–cycle households, despite the fact that earnings distributions are the same for both
groups. Table 5 compares average net worth at diﬀerent ages. The disparity in net worth
becomes very great for the elderly: purely life–cycle households begin decumulating net
worth around retirement age, but dynastic households build wealth, through inheritances
and interest accumulations, until death. The average inheritance of a dynastic household,
in present value at age 20, is about $450,000.
Rows 2–5 follow the same steps, using parameters which deviate from the 1995 base
case as shown in Table 3. When we increase the importance of retirement consumption
or decrease the early in life burden of raising children, the share of nondynastic private
wealth rises about 10 percent. The requisite λ then drops precipitously — as dynastic
wealth, with a smaller overall role, must be more concentrated to match the actual wealth
distribution’s upper tail.
Rows 6–10 of Tables 3–4 present comparative–static results. Instead of calibrating
λ, β, ξ,a n dµ to match empiricaldistributionalstatistics, consumption growth with age,
the interest rate, and wealth–to–earnings ratio, we ﬁx these four parameters from row 1’s
simulation. In row 6, we change KD
t /Qt, n, SSBt/Qt, Bt/Qt, Gt/Qt, and our mortality
and labor–force participation schedules (see Table 1) to 1920 levels. Then we compute the
new steady–state interest rate, consumption–growth–with–age rate, wealth–to–earnings
ratio, τ, τss, and distributionalstatistics. Row 7 repeats the computations with onl y
mortality and participation changing to 1920 levels (i.e., with KD
t /Qt, n, SSBt/Qt, Bt/Qt,
23and Gt/Qt remaining at 1995 values). Row 8 returns to 1995 levels of KD
t /Qt, n, SSBt/Qt,
Bt/Qt, Gt/Qt, and mortality and participation, but it raises SSBt by 50%. Then it
computes a new steady–state interest rate, consumption–growth–with–age rate, wealth–
to–earnings ratio, τ, τss, and wealth distribution. Rows 9–10 do the same after raising Bt
by 50% (for row 9) and the rate of technological progress by 100% (for row 10).
Row 6 of Tables 3–4 bears out the theoretical analysis of Section 3. With shorter lives
and higher labor force participation among survivors, the life–cycle saving of nondynastic
households in 1920 accounts for less than one–half of private wealth, as opposed to two–
thirds in 1995, and average dynastic wealth is 13 times as high as nondynastic wealth,
as opposed to 7 times in 1995. In the simulation for 1920, the Gini coeﬃcient for the
overall distribution of wealth is .87 and the share of the top 1% is .35, while for 1995
the simulation’s Gini is .79 and the share of the top 1% is .27. The net of tax interest
rate, nevertheless, is the same for both years. Row 7 shows the comparison would be even
starker had not socialsecurity, nationaldebt, and government spending changed between
1920 and 1995: the share of nondynastic wealth in 1920 would have been only .29, average
dynastic net worth would have been 33 times as high as nondynastic wealth, the Gini of
the wealth distribution would have been .91, and the share of the top 1% would have been
.45.
Rows 8–9 of Tables 3–4 conﬁrm Section 4’s theoretical analysis of how social security
and nationaldebt can raise the rel ative importance of dynastic saving and thereby increase
wealth inequality. In row 8, a 50% increase in the size of the (1995) social security system
lowers the share of private wealth held by nondynastic households from .68 to .55, raising
the Gini for the steady–state wealth distribution from .79 to .83, and raising the share
of wealth held by the top 1% from .27 to .35. Evidently the eﬀects of social security
changes of this magnitude would be almost as great as the combined demographic and
governmentalchanges between 1920 and 1995. Row 9 shows a 50% increase in the steady–
state nationaldebt–to–output ratio is l ess potent: such a change reduces the share of net
worth of nondynastic households from .68 to .63, raises the wealth Gini from .79 to .80,
and raises the share of the top 1% of wealth holders from .27 to .30.
Row 10 of Tables 3–4 is consistent with Proposition 6 of Section 5. Row 10 shows
that an increase in the rate of technological progress raises the steady–state interest rate
substantially and reduces wealth inequality. The absolute change in inequality in this last
case, however, is not as great as demographic and socialsecurity outcomes in rows 6–8:
the Gini for the simulated distribution of wealth falls from .79 with g =1 .01 to .78 with
g =1 .02, and the share of the top 1% falls from .27 to .24.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a life–cycle model augmented with intentional bequests. A princi-
palfeature of the modelis heterogeneity of preferences: most househol ds feelno obl igations
to their grown children; however, a small fraction of the population has dynastic, or “al-
truistic,” sentiments.
Despite its simplicity and tractability, the model has a number of interesting implica-
tions. (i) It shows that lengthening life spans and falling rates of labor force participation
among older age groups could have increased life–cycle saving in the U.S. and other coun-
tries over the course of the twentieth century without aﬀecting long term interest rates or
24aggregative capitalto l abor ratios. (ii) It shows how the same demographic phenomena
might have played a role in decreasing the degree of inequality in cross sectional distribu-
tions of wealth over the same time period. (iii) It shows that government policies regarding
nationaldebt and socialsecurity can inﬂuence weal th inequal ity, as can changes in the rate
of technological progress. (iv) It shows why so–called Ricardian neutrality might hold in
the long run yet not in the shorter term.
Recent empirical work has tended to yield what seems to be at most quite mild
support for the altruistic model of household behavior. The present paper oﬀers possible
interpretations, however. For instance, Altonji et al. (1992) show that intergenerational
linkages apparently are far from universal, and evidence in Laitner and Juster (1996)
seems to imply that linkages which do exist are hard to predict on the basis of economic
variables. Both ﬁndings are consistent with this paper’s analysis. Even more recently,
regressions in Altonji et al. (1997) and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) based on inter vivos gifts
and inheritances, respectively, in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics derive coeﬃcient
estimates which conform in sign to the altruistic model but are much smaller in magnitude
than the theory predicts. In the present paper, the calibrated examples ﬁt distributional
data best when dynastic behavior is rare, perhaps manifested by 10% of all households
or less. On the one hand, this suggests that intergenerational transfers evident in general
data sets, where their frequency is 20–40%, may represent a mixture of altruistic and
nonaltruistic behavior — and that the mixing may bias econometric results. On the other
hand, our simulations imply substantial diﬀerences between the net worth of dynastic and
nondynastic households, perhaps, in turn, indicating a need for special data sources able
to capture the behavior of very wealthy households.
25Appendix
This appendix describes the simulations for Fig. 6 in Section 4.
First, we develop a system of three equations determining the evolution of a state
vector zt ≡ ( ˜ Kt, ˜ sd
1,t−1,˜ it), where ˜ Kt ≡ Kt/gt,˜ sd
1,t−1 ≡ sd
1,t−1/gt−1, ˜ it ≡ it/gt. Without




2,t−1 + it;( A1)












· ξ · cd
2,t−1;( A2)
and ﬁrst period of life accounting,
cd
1t = Wt · gt − τt + it − sd
1t. (A3)
Combining the three, we have




· ξ · [Rt · sd
1,t−1 − it]. (A4)
Using Bt = B0 · gt and government budget constraint (23) to eliminate τt, using (11) to
characterize Rt and Wt from Kt, and then dividing through by gt, this yields an equation
in zt and zt+1.
The second equation comes directly from Section 4:
sd
1t = θ · [Wt · gt + it − τt]+
(1 − θ) · it+1
Rt+1
. (A5)
The ﬁnalequation comes from (24):
Kt+1 + Bt+1 =( 1− λ) · θ · [Wt · gt − τt]+λ · sd
1t. (A6)
For Fig. 6, diﬀerentiate the detrended system generated from (A4)–(A6) with respect







where M is a 3×3m a t r i xa n dm a 3–element vector. Evaluate the terms in M and m at the
old steady state, producing a linearization there. As we start, history provides initial values
for ˜ Kt and ˜ sd
1.t−1, but not for ˜ it; thus, under rationalexpectations, a l inearized version of
the dynamic system needs exactly two eigenvalues of absolute value less than one to avoid
indeterminacy and instability — i.e., to achieve so–called “saddlepoint stability.” That
turns out to be the case for the example, the eigenvalues being 1.39, 0.65, and 0.35.
26Simulation of (A7) yields, for example, dKt/dB0 all t =0 ,1,2,..... Letting Kt be the










with (B00 − B0)/B0 set to 1%, and B00 the new time–0 government debt. See Lait-
ner (1990), for instance, for more discussion of this generalmethodol ogy.
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29Table 1. Household Data: Survival Fractions, Labor Force Participation,
and Experiential Human Capital
Age s 1995 Fraction 1920 Fraction Life–Cycle Life–Cycle Life–Cycle
20 Yearolds 20 Yearolds Earnings Earnings × Earnings ×
Remaining Remaining Participation Participation
Alive Alive Rates 1995 Rates 1920
20 1.00 1.00 5,814 4,678 5,174
25 .99 .97 13,341 11,615 12,176
30 .99 .94 19,333 17,973 18,085
35 .98 .91 23,323 21,601 22,269
40 .97 .88 26,666 24,566 25,133
45 .96 .84 28,967 26,179 26,947
50 .94 .79 28,885 25,320 26,517
55 .91 .74 26,941 20,545 24,435
60 .87 .67 23,763 14,984 21,553
65 .82 .57 12,719 4,274 11,536
70 .73 .46 6,396 1,477 3,988
75 .63 .33 4,788 603 1,629
80 .49 .20 3,264 69 185
85 .32 .09 1,740 0 0
90 .13 .03 215 0 0
95 .02 .00 0 0 0
100 .00 .00 0 0 0
Source: Column 2: average death rates 1990, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1998, p.95).
Column 3: death rates 1920, Historical Statistics of the United States (1975, p.60).
Column 4: Median earnings men 1990,
Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement (1993, p.165).
Column 5: column 4 multiplied by 1995 male labor force participation rates,
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1997, p.397).
Column 6: column 4 multiplied by 1920 male labor force participation rates,























t + Bt]/[(1 − α) · Qt] 4.6102
Kt/Qt 2.3386
Source: see text.Table 3. Simulated Fraction of Dynastic Family Lines
Trial Simu– Deviation Non– Ratio R R Frac–
lation from dynastic Average Net Gross tion
Year Year’s Share Dynastic of of Dynas–
Base– of Total to Non– Tax Tax tic
Case Private dynastic Fami–
Para– Wealth Wealth lies:
metersa λ
Base–Case 1995 and Sensitivity Analysis
1 1995 none .678 6.702 1.045 1.059 .083
2 1995 υ = .85 .761 12.791 1.045 1.059 .027
3 1995 ω = .20 .740 9.786 1.045 1.059 .040
4 1995 σ2
x = .6344 .678 5.734 1.045 1.059 .100
5 1995 µ = .06 .619 5.742 1.061 1.079 .130
Comparative Statics: β, ξ,a n dλ from Trial 1
6 1920 none .494 13.341 1.045 1.051 .083
7 1920 trial 1 parameters; .285 33.268 1.045 1.059 .083
1920 mortality and
participation rates
8 1995 SSBt/Qt = .062 .551 10.822 1.045 1.059 .083
9 1995 Bt/Qt = .680 .627 8.182 1.045 1.060 .083
10 1995 g =1 .02 .722 5.631 1.061 1.079 .083
a. See Tables 1–2.Table 4. Simulated Distribution of Wealth
Nondynastic Households All Households
Triala Gini Share Share Frac– Gini Share Share Frac–
Top Top tion Top Top tion
1% 5% zero 1% 5% zero
wealth wealth
Base–Case 1995 and Sensitivity Analysis
1 .690 .098 .300 .284 .787 .267 .505 .303
2 .687 .098 .299 .284 .762 .285 .462 .295
3 .672 .095 .292 .263 .758 .283 .469 .281
4 .705 .109 .322 .284 .793 .257 .509 .304
5 .703 .101 .307 .363 .811 .256 .537 .408
Comparative Statics: β, ξ,a n dλ from Trial 1
6 .778 .127 .376 .550 .871 .353 .650 .547
7 .743 .111 .337 .508 .907 .448 .785 .516
8 .693 .099 .301 .324 .827 .349 .599 .356
9 .690 .098 .300 .284 .803 .301 .544 .319
10 .695 .099 .303 .324 .777 .239 .474 .339
a. Parameter values as in Table 3.Table 5. Average Household Net Worth (dollars)
at Selected Ages: 1995 Base–Case Parameters
Nondynastic Dynastic Overall
Age Household Household Household
Net Worth Net Worth Net Worth
20 0 1,106 92
25 0 3,477 290
30 0 10,471 873
35 1,111 28,266 3,375
40 10,267 68,052 15,084
45 66,852 161,454 74,739
50 138,403 344,627 155,595
55 204,771 623,045 239,642
60 246,880 1,010,905 310,576
65 231,846 1,464,889 334,643
70 221,226 2,122,170 379,705
75 209,734 2,772,003 423,347
80 181,234 3,181,128 431,331
85 136,147 3,331,539 402,543
90 88,396 3,637,942 384,317
95 44,001 4,090,848 381,381F
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